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I. Introduction
Ensuring the authenticity of signatures is vital to all contracts. It is of special concern in
the context of electronic commerce because e-commerce business ventures not only dis-
pense with face-to-face dealings, but also lack the normal verification procedures that one
can apply to, say, contracts by facsimile-where at the very least, the recipient of a document
can see a specimen signature on a document even if that document is not what might be
called an original in classic contract parlance. Without some technological mechanisms and
legal principles for assuring the legitimacy of contracting parties' signatures, the legitimacy
of contractual relationships in electronic commerce will never be firmly established.
Slightly over two years ago, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) promulgated
an important set of legal principles for digital signatures, known as the General Usage for
International Digitally Ensured Commerce (GUIDEC), that comprise an important step
in dealing with parties' signatures and that go a long way toward developing that legitimacy
that is so important for the future of electronic commerce generally.' This article describes
the GUIDEC principles, makes some comparisons between the GUIDEC and other digital
signature ventures, and offers some suggestions as to their utilization in various types of
electronic contracts.
II. The International Chamber of Commerce and the GUIDEC
A. THE ICC's IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
The ICC is a body that is quite familiar to international business practitioners, but may
be somewhat obscure for lawyers whose experience is mainly in domestic contracting. The
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1. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, GENERAL USAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL DIGITALLY ENSURED
COMMERCE (2000), at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/guidec/guidec.asp [hereinafter GUIDEC].
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ICC has had an enormous impact on a whole host of international business operations. For
example, the ICC's Uniform Customs and Practices (UCP) provide the fundamental rules
governing such things as international letters of credit and other types of documentary
collections.' The impact of the UCP is so vast that even banks in the United States who
might, arguably, utilize the provisions of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Let-
ters of Credit), apply the UCP in international letters of credit. The ICC's promulgation
of so-called trade terms, such as EO.B. (free on board) or C.I.E, through its now famous
Incoterms, dominate the field of shipping terms for international sales contracts.'
Most recently, the ICC has launched an impressive venture known as the ICC Electronic
Commerce Project (ECP).4 Among other things, the not-yet-completed ECP is developing
a set of foundation rules for electronic trade and settlement that are intended to "make
trade more efficient by not only adapting rules to new technologies and media such as the
Internet, but by taking advantage of these new tools to streamline trade transactions."' The
ICC recognized, as early as 1997 that the key to successful international electronic com-
merce is the development of self-regulating business principles backed by a "sound frame-
work of legal jurisdiction."' The ECP is broken down into various business sectors such as
banking technique and practice, telecommunications and information technologies, finan-
cial services and insurance, transport, and international commercial practice. 7 Another doc-
ument in the making, E-Terms, is an attempt to develop a standard set of definitions for
all the factors that enter into electronic transactions. The E-Terms project is currently in
what the computer experts might call beta testing.8
B. THE GUIDEC PRINCIPLES: PRECURSORS AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
1. Some Precursors
The GUIDEC, as most readers will recognize, was not the first kid on the block. A
number of U.S. state legislatures have enacted digital signature statutes.' The Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, working with a proposed addition to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, made a valiant attempt to promulgate U.C.C. Article 2B that is now being
adopted in a somewhat piecemeal fashion by various states after the full-blown Article 2B
was disavowed by the Commissioners. 10 The United Nations published a Model Law on
Electronic Commerce that contains digital signature provisions."' The American Bar As-
2. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY
CREDIT UCP 500 (1994).
3. See INCOTERMS 2000: ICC OFFICIAL RULES FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF TRADE TERMS (2000).
4. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ICC ELECTRONIC COMMERCE PROJECT (2001), at
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/electronic_commerce/electronic commerce project.asp [hereinafter ECP.
5. Id.
6. Press Release, International Chamber of Commerce, Making Rules for Electronic Commerce (Nov. 14,
1997), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news-archives/1997/making-rules.asp [hereinafter Making
Rules].
7. ECP, supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-1001 (2000).
10. See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 2B (Proposed Draft 1998).
11. See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Annex I, Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/51/17 (1996), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 197 (1997), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm.htm [hereinafter Model Law].
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sociation has ventured into the fray by way of its Digital Signature Guidelines.2 All these
developments seek to fashion generally accepted principles for authenticating documents
through the device of a digital signature. By and large, they attempt to do so without
prescribing a particular technology for authentication. GUIDEC builds on all of these
precursors.
When beginners venture into the realm of electronic commerce, things often appear
murky, unsettled, and far beyond the powers of mere mortals to comprehend. In truth,
electronic commerce is simply ordinary commercial dealings based on a new form of com-
munication-the Internet. There are a number of existing electronically based practices
that work quite well in ensuring the safety and security of commercial communication and
practices. For example, international banks have long exchanged highly secure messages
that transfer money from bank to bank under principles and techniques promulgated by
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT).1 Some
companies have developed "virtual private Internets," which are electronic communications
systems that exist as a closed, private system within the public Internet community.i* These
systems have a relatively strong track record. But the more pressing problem is how to
develop sound, reliable, and legally enforceable techniques for transactions between mer-
chants and consumers (so-called B2C commerce) or between merchants (so-called B2B
commerce) that make electronic transactions as safe and legitimate as conventional paper-
based transactions. As noted above, digital signatures lie at the heart of the problem.
2. Some Technical Background
There are a number of ways to deal with digital signatures as a matter of computer
technology. A simple e-mail where the writer of the e-mail simply types his name is a type
of digital signature. The problem with this kind of signature is how to verify that the
originator of the e-mail is in fact the individual whose name is typed at the bottom of the
e-mail. Most observers do not consider the mere receipt of an e-mail to be a sufficiently
reliable guaranty of identity to be used as the basis for a contractual relationship.
A second possibility is to simply have the two contracting parties agree on a password
that they believe is known only to the two of them to properly identify and confirm that
the person with whom I'm communicating is the person with whom I wish to contract. In
other words, I may exchange e-mails with someone and append the numbers "123" to my
typed name. If I have made previous arrangements with the other person as to the nature
of the password, my recipient may be wholly satisfied that he or she is hearing directly from
me when my name includes the digits "123."
But once again, this does not really suffice because electronic commerce cannot be based
either on extraordinarily loose and insecure e-mail where names are merely typed at the
end of the communication. Businesses cannot be burdened with the need to exchange earlier
communications that establish passwords known only to the two parties. At its optimum,
electronic commerce should be a system where two persons who are complete strangers
can complete valid transactions with only one or two exchanges of messages. Moreover,
these messages should be subject to generally well-known and accepted secrecy devices so
12. AMERICAN BAR AssocIATIoN, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, available at http://www.abanet.org/
scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
13. SWIFT, http://www.swift.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
14. See the discussion in Responding to the Legal Obstacles to Electronic Commerce in Latin America, 17 ARiz. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 9 (2000).
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that there is simply no doubt that the communications are between the two actual con-
tracting parties.
To this end, electronic commerce specialists have enlisted a long-understood set of prin-
ciples and practices that involve code breaking and encryption to resolve problems of iden-
tity. While avoiding a long digression into the different forms of cryptography, a short
explanation is in order to set the stage for a discussion of the GUIDEC. Cryptography has
been defined as the "art and science of keeping messages secure.""5 It has long been used
as a device for protecting matters of national security and exchanging messages between,
say, military forces in the field. The tensions that give rise to cryptography are simple: two
people wish to exchange a message and wish to conceal the terms of that message from
third parties.
Basically, cryptography involves a person sending a message in so-called plaintext who
encrypts (i.e., scrambles) that message so that only the intended receiver of the message can
decrypt (unscramble) the text of the message. Encryption involves the use of keys by which
the scrambling takes place. In encryption there are always two keys-a public key that is
typically distributed among a large number of persons and a private key that is known only
to the specific individuals who are attempting to communicate with each other. 16 For our
purposes, suffice it to say that there are many techniques and technologies that might be
used to encrypt commercial messages.
Some digital signature statutes, most notably Utah's, require a particular type of cryp-
tography to be utilized by the parties. But most proponents of electronic commerce take
just the opposite approach and urge the development of rules that permit businesses "to
choose the cryptographic systems that best suit their needs" and that avoid "any mandatory
system based on a specific technology."' This is essentially the road taken by the GUIDEC.
C. THE GUIDEC
1. Underlying Goals and Concepts
The ICC developed the GUIDEC by setting up a multi-disciplinary team of experts
from a number of different countries"s who reviewed a number of precursors (the UN
venture and the ABA's pronouncements) to come up with the final GUIDEC text. The
working party saw the key problem as one involving the lack of physical signatures in
electronic messages. 9 But there were other goals: electronic commerce needed some com-
monly accepted terms and definitions and needed to be established in a context that would
guarantee acceptance by the entire international business community.
Probably the most important precursor of the GUIDEC, and the statement of legal
principles on which GUIDEC expressly builds, is the UNCITRAL Model Law on Elec-
15. BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN C I (2d ed.
1996). See generally the general discussion in CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin, eds. 1996).
16. F.L. BAUER, DECRYPTED SECRETS: METHODS AND MAXIMS OF CRYPTOLOGY 25-26 (1997).
17. ALLIANCE FOR GLOBAL BUSINESS, A GLOBAL ACTION PLAN FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 25 (2d ed., 1999).
This report includes a great deal of the discussion set out in OECD's CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY: THE GUIDELINES
AND THE ISSUES (1997), available at http://www.oece.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/GD97-204.htm.
18. Mr. William Kennair, a notary in the United Kingdom, served as the Chair of the Information Security
Working Party.
19. GUIDEC, supra note 1.
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tronic Commerce.2 ° The GUIDEC working party found the Model Law, promulgated by
UNCITRAL in 1997, to be incomplete and insufficient in its treatment of digital signatures.
The Model Law, for example, does not specify what method of signing a message might
be appropriate under particular circumstances. Its express provision on digital signatures
simply defines signature as any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention
to authenticate a writing.2 While the commentary deals, somewhat more elaborately, with
the digital signature phenomenon, the commentary merely provides that the focus should
be on a party's "intention to authenticate" rather than emphasizing the precise manner in
which a symbol is affixed to the document.
Note that while the Model Law is salutary in avoiding the adoption of any particular
technology, it is so broad that even an "X" placed at the end of an e-mail message would
suffice as a legally valid and binding digital signature. The GUIDEC working party simply
did not find this an acceptable practice for the international business community. The
GUIDEC is much more explicit on the nature of the signature, the means by which a
signature is ensured or authenticated, because, in the view of the working party, "digitally
authenticated or ensured messages [must] retain their non-repudiable characteristics for
evidentiary purposes."22
The GUIDEC text is divided into several chapters including a great deal of discussion
of electronic commerce generally and of existing laws. As a threshold matter, the GUIDEC
is applicable only to what the Uniform Commercial Code refers to as trade between mer-
chants or B2B commerce, As the GUIDEC preface explains: the GUIDEC "assumes prac-
tices in which transacting parties are expert commercial actors, operating under the lex
mercatoria. The [GUIDEC] does not attempt to define rights and responsibilities for trans-
actions involving consumers."23
The GUIDEC sets out a glossary of terms, a section on best practices, and a section on
certification. The policies that underlie the GUIDEC are straightforward and easily un-
derstood. They include a goal of enhancing "the ability of the international business com-
munity to execute secure digital transactions" and the establishment of "legal principles
that promote trustworthy and reliable digital ensuring and certification practices. '2 4
The GUIDEC places virtually all of its emphasis on open Internet-based commerce in
systems that "offer access and communication between multiple parties not contractually
obligated to systems managers [i.e., closed proprietary systems] thereby exposing businesses
to trading partners with whom those businesses have no prior relationship."25 In reaching
20. Model Law, mpra note 11, at 70.
21. Id. art. 7.
22. GUIDEC, supra note 1, V.I.
23. Id. 1.2.
24. Id. These are the first two principles. The other principles, somewhat redundant, are:
(3) to encourage the development of trustworthy ensuring and certification systems,
(4) to protect users of the digital information infrastructure from fraud and errors,
(5) to balance ensuring and certification technologies with existing policies, laws, customs, and practices,
(6) to define and clarify the duties of participants in the emerging ensuring and certification system,
and
(7) to foster global awareness of developments in ensuring and certification technology and its rela-
tionship to secure electronic commerce.
Id.
25. Id. 11.5. The GUIDEC defines closed networks as those in which specific business entities "control
physical access to the system, conduct communications according to written and approved procedures, maintain
record systems designed to facilitate quality assurance, and create legal obligations between users and the
organization responsible for operating the system." Id. 11.2.
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its goals, the GUIDEC recognizes the basic encryption techniques of public key and private
key-resulting in what other promulgations call a digital signature and what the GUIDEC
refers to as "ensuring a message." As the GUIDEC notes: "Because an ensured message is
difficult to forge, its use binds the signatory, precluding a later repudiation of the message
... [and] forms the basis for forming legally binding contracts ... since [the ensured
message] can provide electronically the same forensic effect a signed paper message
provides.26
One of the primary contributions of the GUIDEC, as noted, is the development of a
standard vocabulary for dealing with electronic signatures. Within the definitional struc-
ture, perhaps the central contribution is the use of the term ensure or ensuring a message
in place of the more common digital signature. The drafters concluded that because of the
differences in United States and European definitions of authenticate27 and the concept of
digitally signing a message, a new term was justified. In the GUIDEC glossary ensuring a
message, means "(a) the ensurer had contact with the message and (b) the message has been
preserved intact since it was ensured."2 There are many other definitions in the GUIDEC
glossary, but these terms are better understood in the context of the GUIDEC's best prac-
tices requirements.
The primary contribution of the GUIDEC is the development of some salutary principles
for electronic contracts grouped under the best practices heading. Best practices is divided
into several parts: ensuring a message and the legal significance of such ensuring; appro-
priate practices for ensuring a message; the scope of an ensured message; safeguarding an
ensuring device; certification and the effect of a valid certificate; and suspension or revo-
cation of public key certificates.
As the GUIDEC notes: a message is ensured as a factual matter if there is evidence to
indicate (1) the identity of the ensurer; and (2) that the message has not been altered since
it was ensured. 29 Moreover, a recipient or other interested person is required to attribute
an ensured message to the person who actually ensured it. This provision has the effect of
stability and predictability in that attribution is virtually automatic once a message is known
to have been ensured. In the case of the use of an agent, the principal will be bound "if,
under applicable law, the agent had sufficient authority to ensure the message." 0 Clearly,
this provision contemplates a business executive permitting a secretary to transmit a binding
ensured message. Finally, the person who creates an ensured message must, within the
context of that message, "clearly indicate what is being ensured.""
The GUIDEC does not insist on any particular technology or protocol for ensuring
messages. The best practices text merely provides: "An ensurer must ensure a message by
26. Id. 111.3.
27. In the United States, the term authenticate seems to be used merely to associate a person with a message
while in Europe authenticate has associations with the actual verification of a signature.
28. GUIDEC, supra note 1, VI.1.
29. Id. VII1.
30. Id. VII.3.
31. Id. V11.5. This point may be somewhat obscure but is nonetheless important. As the GUIDEC com-
mentary explains: "Since ensuring a message does not apply to alterations of the message, a person receiving
the ensured message must determine whether the message arrives intact. Such a determination is only possible
if the message has been clearly delimited and linked to when it was ensured." Because electronic communi-
cations are not necessarily standard as to margins, formatting, and the like, "[lt]he parties should agree, in
specifying the form for their messages, which variations are to be considered significant." Id. VII.5.
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a means appropriate under the circumstances."32 At first glance, this provision might be
seen to contain the same seeds of ambiguity as the UNCITRAL Model Law. But the real
meat in the GUIDEC is contained in the next section of best practices under the heading
"Certification."
Ensured messages are transmitted only under the auspices of a certificate that is defined
as "a message ensured by a person, which message attests to the accuracy of facts material
to the legal efficacy of the act of another person."" The basic concept of certificate under
the GUIDEC is not terribly different from the notion of a certificate that might be issued
by, say, a notary public, who acts to authenticate a particular document. But in the specific
context of electronic commerce, the notion of certificate mainly contemplates a public key
certificate issued by an appropriate certifier whose authority to issue such certificates is
carefully policed.
The concept of certification is vital to the GUIDEC. As the working group explains:
The use of public key cryptography for digital signature purposes require that a trusted third
party establish that holders of public keys are indeed who they purport to be. Without a trusted
third party certifying that a given individual is in fact the holder of a public key, it is impossible
for other transacting parties on the network to know for certain that the holder of the public
key is not an imposter.1
4
As the GUIDEC explains further: "This third party, known in the GUIDEC as a Certifier,
will form the trust backbone for all types of commercial and non-commercial transactions
taking place over open networks."3
To begin with, a certifier must use "only technologically reliable information systems and
processes, and trustworthy personnel in issuing a certificate. '36 A technologically reliable
certificate is one that is "reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse;" and provides "a
reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation."37 The certifier commits
to using only "technologically reliable information systems and processes, and trustworthy
personnel in issuing a certificate."18 As the GUIDEC commentary points out, "[tihe trust-
worthiness of a certifier is central to the whole concept of certification."3"
To become a certifier is not necessarily easy or inexpensive. For example, a certifier "must
have financial resources sufficient to conduct its business and bear the reasonable risks
resulting from the certificates it issues." 4 A certifier must keep detailed records. 4I A certifier
must notify affected persons of any problems with a particular certificate. 42 And certificates
are subject to suspension or revocation.43 While these principles are somewhat broadly
stated, the GUIDEC envisions the development of additional laws and regulations that will
"prescribe clear rules and liabilities for certifiers."
32. Id. VII.4.










43. Id. VIII.8, .9, .10, .11.
44. Id. 111.4.
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III. Some Brief Predictions and Prognostications
The GUIDEC is an excellent beginning to one of the thorniest problems in electronic
commerce. Until and unless merchants can approach electronic commerce with the same
understandings of stability, predictability, and security that they now enjoy using paper
contracts, the Internet will never be the earth-shattering development envisioned by so
many recent commentators. Perhaps the fundamental premise of the GUIDEC is its stron-
gest advantage: in international business it is generally much better to permit the merchants
to make-and abide by-their own rules rather than having meddlesome-and often in-
expert-governmental bodies establish basic principles of conduct. This point is well borne
out by the success of the UCP and Incoterms. In this respect, the prestige of the ICC will
be instrumental in adoption of the GUIDEC by international merchants.
In this author's opinion, it is also vital that rules governing digital signature be truly
international in scope, reflecting the profound international consequences of electronic
commerce. A "Balkanization" of electronic commerce rules will inhibit e-commerce for
many years in the future. The GUIDEC is truly international.
But the GUIDEC has not yet been universally accepted. Currently its provisions conflict
in many respects with other similar sets of rules, each of which has its own proponents and
detractors. Further, it is highly doubtful whether individual national governments will be
able to keep their hands off such fundamental principles of international commercial prac-
tice. The UCP and the Incoterms function mainly because they are relatively obscure rules
of conduct that do not have terribly important consequences for national governments.
That may not be the case for digital signatures. Finally, it may have been a mistake for the
GUIDEC to restrict itself only to B2B commerce. Does it make sense to have one set of
digital signature rules solely between merchants and conceivably a different (and potentially
conflicting) set of rules for trade between merchants and consumers? This author believes
that solid, comprehensible, and enforceable principles can be worked out for both B2B and
B2C commerce within the same rules structure. If various governments and other bodies
develop wholly different rules for consumer transactions, the GUIDEC may never be fully
accepted.
At the time of this writing, the jury is still out on the GUIDEC. Whether the GUIDEC
succeeds or fails will only be apparent with the passage of time.
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